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LAWRENCE  LESSIG: Copyright in the United States did not reach
beyond  the  United  States  until  1891.  For  the  first  hundred  years  in  the
United States'  history, we protected no foreign copyrights at all. We were,
in the modem parlance, born  a pirate nation.
In the context of patents,  we have  always had a tradition that respects
the local reach of patent protection.  That tradition has  spoken  importantly
about protecting in a local context and  argued increasingly about extending
that local  protection. But at this moment we  are  in a process  of reforming
that tradition. We stated the objectives of this practice, to reach an ideal  of
universal  intellectual  property  protection.  An  ideal  which  is  increasingly
expressed  as  an  abstract right, which  reaches  everywhere  universally,
which  is  to  be  enforced  everywhere.  This  tradition  now  speaks  of  an
absolute  principle  that  should reach  around  the  world  without  selectivity
and  without  condition.  I think  this  reforming  of our  tradition  is  a  good
thing,  generally. I  think  in  particular  that  patents  are  a  good  thing,
generally. I think in particular that drug patents are a good thing, generally.
I believe without them, without a system of patent protection for drugs, we
would  not begin  to  have  the  kind  of  investment  and  innovation  and  the
creation of new drugs. That a  system of producing ways to solve problems
of disease depends upon this particular system of protection. And of all the
areas  of patent  protection  perhaps  this  one  more  than  any,  deserves  the
support of our tradition, generally.
But our problem is  that this way of reforming  a system of intellectual
property protection, has taken this idea of "generally,"  and restated it as an
absolute.  This  tradition  that  has  taught  us  the  importance  of  a balanced
system of protection,  especially  in the  context of things like  drug patents,
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has now been  conceived of as an absolute right that should extend without
qualification  everywhere.  Now  this expression of this new conception  has
occurred  most dramatically  in the context of an agreement  which otherwise
seems  to  be  an  agreement  expressing  a  tradition  of balance.  We  have
recently  seen  the  adoption  of  the  TRIPS  [Trade-Related  Aspects  of
Intellectual  Property  Rights]'  Agreement around  the world. An  agreement
which  attempts  to  assure  the  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights
around  the  world,  through  a  general  system  of  protection,  with  the
extraordinarily  important exceptions built in for developing  nations. These
exceptions,  while  still  not  as broad  as  some of us  would have preferred,
express  the  fundamental  ideal  that our  profession  has  always taught:  that
intellectual  property protections  are  to  be balanced  across  the contexts  in
which they get enforced,  and in different contexts they need to be enforced
differently.
But though  this  ideal  expresses  itself within  the  TRIPS  Agreement
we, the United States, have increasingly  attempted to effectively change the
TRIPS Agreement. Not by explicit modification  of the TRIPS Agreement,
but  instead through  a  practice  of bilateral  negotiations  which  the  United
States  has  engaged  in  with  developing  nations,  where  the  United  States
insists  that  developing  nations  impose  upon  themselves  stronger
obligations than the  TRIPS Agreement  requires.  We  use the power of our
trading  position  to  force  developing  nations  to  adopt  what  is  effectively
"TRIPS  plus"  protection.  A  regime  which  increasingly,  effectively,  does
not express  this tradition of balance, but instead  expresses this tradition  of
absolute protection. Instead  of manifesting  what we  as a profession  know,
that  the  reach of intellectual  property  protection  needs  to  be  conditioned
depending upon the context, it expresses this ideal. And thus this system of
balanced  protection suffers. This  tradition suffers.  Because examples of its
extremism  become  so  extreme  that  no  one  can  continue  to  stare  at  the
system of intellectual  property protection that we are  defending and accept
it.
A theorist's place in this extremism, manifests  itself in opposition,  is
in the context of Africa, where  thirty million people right now are  infected
with  a  disease  which  could  be,  to  some important  extent,  treated-but  is
not. Where  three  million five  hundred thousand  people  will  die  next year
from  this  disease.  People  who  could  have  had  their  life  extended  in
treatments  from drugs  which  will  not be  made  available  to  them.  Where
fifty-eight percent of the people infected with this disease are women. With
1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
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the ordinary  mode by which this  disease  is spread  is  through  heterosexual
sex. No drugs effectively  deal with this disease  in this place. Increasingly,
activists  are  getting people  around  the  world  to  ask  this question-why?
What could possibly justify a situation where  millions of people who could
be  saved  are  not being  saved?  Now the  claim that  is asserted  against  the
argument  that  these  drugs  should be  made  available  to  these  people  is  a
claim  increasingly  framed  in this  rhetoric  of theft. That to  permit African
nations  to  take  the  knowledge  necessary  to  combine  ordinary  chemicals
and  turn  them  into  a  drug  which  could  actually  save  human  beings-to
permit  that-would  be  to  facilitate  a  kind  of  theft.  It  is  stealing. It  is
stealing  the  intellectual  property  which  has  been  produced  by  drug
companies  through their own  investment  of resources  into  the  production
of knowledge  about how  to solve  disease.  This  rhetoric  frames the  debate
as  if what  happens  in  Africa  when African  nations  demand  the  right  to
import these drugs free of patent protection,  frames the debate to say what
they  are  demanding  is  the  right  to  steal.  And  increasingly,  activists  are
getting people to recognize that this is an odd form of theft. Because unlike
taking millions of tons of wheat, which might be produced  in the middle of
the United  States, and shipping it to Africa to deal with the starvation,  this
taking of knowledge  actually  physically removes  nothing  from any  of us.
We  lose  nothing  from  the  drug  companies.  It's  an abstract  taking,  not  a
physical  taking.  And  because  these  nations  are  so  poor  anyway,  it's not
even as if an opportunity cost is lost. It's not as if these nations could afford
to pay  the  money necessary  to pay  for these  drugs.  So  it's not even  as  if
money is being taken from these people.  So if no actual materials  are being
removed  and  no  potential  profits  are  being  removed,  what  is  it  that
motivates  this  extraordinarily  strong  desire  to  defend  these  intellectual
property protections we face? Fifteen to thirty million people will die when
drugs are not delivered in time.
Well,  it's not my  view the drug  companies  have no concern  for  this
problem.  It's not my  view that they're  callous in  their concern  for people
dying in Africa.  It's a much more invidious transaction that is going on to
slow  the  spread  of these  drugs  into  the  nations  that  are  necessary.  My
judgment  is  that  these  companies  would be  completely  happy to  permit
these  drugs to  be  exploited  in  these  nations  at zero  marginal  cost,  at  the
lowest possible price available. But they resist this because they recognize,
not so much the danger that these drugs  will end  up on errant markets, but
the danger that the  fact that they make  drugs available  cheaply  in African
nations will be used against them. When politicians from rich nations say to
them,  "How  is  it  that  the  drugs  which  you  sell  for  fifty  cents  a pill  in
Africa, you charge  $1,000  a pill for it in the United States?"  They're afraid
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that the politicians  will turn against them and cling to  the fact that they've
made  drugs  available  at the  economically  rational  price,  practically  zero,
and  then  force them  to  accept  the  same  pricing  structure within  the  rich
nation. So their behavior is not motivated by callousness.  It's not motivated
by  a  lack of concern.  Their behavior  is motivated  by the  recognition  that
we,  the  rich  nations,  will  use  the  political  process  to  force  them  into  a
pricing  structure  which  is  fundamentally  inconsistent with  their ability  to
support  research  in  the  context  of  innovation  to  solve  these  [problems].
This is a failure of a political process. And worse than the failure  it reveals
about  our political  process,  it's a failure  that will  increasingly weaken the
ability  for  intellectual  property  protections  to  be  respected  around  the
world.
Now  we,  in  this  tradition  of professionalism,  have  an  obligation  to
help  this  debate.  We  have  an  obligation  to  help  people  understand  the
complexity  of this  debate.  To  teach  these  people  who would  pervert  our
tradition, either by re-expressing the tradition in terms of an absolute, or by
forcing companies to adopt pricing structures which have no relationship to
the economic  incentives  that they  need to produce. We need to teach  those
two extremes the importance of the balance that has defined our tradition of
intellectual property exception, and  that that  tradition has  always admitted
exceptions.  That the "generally,"  which is mushy and hard to articulate, the
"generally"  has admitted that there have been places  where the reach of the
IP right has not been demanded. We need to teach this as our past and teach
people  to embrace  this  ideal  of exceptions.  To help them  understand  how
these  exceptions don't define  a compromise of the principle of intellectual
property protection.  These  exceptions  teach us where  intellectual property
protection  makes  sense,  and  where  it  makes  no  sense.  And  if we  could
teach  this  ideal  of exceptionalism  to  the  political  process,  then  we  could
recognize  the  opportunity  again  that  we  protect  intellectual  property
strongly  in  those  places  where  it makes  sense,  and we  except  intellectual
property protection strongly where that protection  is doing harm.
Twenty  years  from  now,  we will  look  back  at the  decisions we  are
making  today,  when  years  from  now  we  will  know  how  many  of these
thirty million  people died because  they didn't  have  drugs which we  could
be providing at an extraordinarily  low cost today. That number is certain to
be  more  than  ten  million.  It  could  be  more  than  twenty-five  million.
Twenty  years  from  now  people  will  ask  how  we  sat  back  while  ten  to
twenty-five million people died.  In the name  of what will they  die?  What
would stop us  from allowing these elements of knowledge to spread around
the  world freely  so that people could build the technologies  to  save ten  to
twenty-five  million  people?  Twenty  years  from  now  it  will  seemTHE INTERNATIONAL  INFORMATION SOCIETY
extraordinary  that a  simple ideal about  an abstract right, which if violated
takes  nothing  from  us  and  costs  nothing  to  people  whose  rights  were
violated-it will seem extraordinary that that simple ideal stood in the way
of stopping the death of ten to twenty-five million people.  Our children will
look at us and they will have no understanding  of what we are allowing to
happen  right  now.  They  will  have  no  comprehension  of what  we  have
done.
We are  lawyers who  come from a tradition that teaches us something
different.  That we have allowed our profession to allow this to happen is a
criticism  that  we  need  to  take  seriously.  Our tradition  teaches  enough  to
show  the place  where  this  exception  should be  allowed,  and  that place  is
Africa.  It teaches  enough  to  show  us that we  should defend  the  rights  of
drug  companies  to  charge the  money  they  charge  in rich  nations  for the
drugs which they  are producing. Our tradition  teaches us this balance and
we  have  an  obligation  to  stand  outside  of the  interest  of our clients  and
teach the political process this same lesson.
(CLAPPING)
AUDIENCE:  INAUDIBLE
MR.  LESSIG:  It's  a hard  question  that  I think  leads  people  to the
absolute  position. It's too hard  to make  the judgment of balance,  so  let's
just insist on the extreme.  And the extreme is  insisted on both  sides.  One
side of the extreme is "absolute  protection  everywhere,"  and the other side
of the  extreme  is  "destroy  patents."  No patents  anywhere.  I  don't  have
much  faith  that  we  as  a  profession  can  teach  this  idea  of balance  and
judgment. So, I'm not sure I have an answer that is actually implementable,
but we need to try to say that we except places in the context of emergency.
We  seemed to recognize  it when  it was a drug called Cipro2 in the United
States.  There  was  an  emergency  in  the  United  States  and  immediately
everyone  spoke  about the  need for  a compulsory  license  for  Cipro  in the
United States.3  So, we recognize when it affects us. We need to recognize  it
in other places,  too, and combine  the recognition of places where we need
an  exception  with the  recognition that there are places  that don't need an
exception. The United  States needs no exception from the rules that govern
intellectual  property  with  respect  to  drugs.  If we  believe  in  intellectual
property  with respect to drugs, then we  should allow the market to price it
2. "Cipro  (ciprofloxacin  hydrochloride)  is  an antibiotic used  to treat  bacterial  infections  in
many  different  parts  of the  body.  Cipro  is  approved  for  the  inhaled  form  of anthrax  after  an
individual  has  been  exposed."  See  Center  for  Drug  Evaluation  and  Research  website  at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cipro  (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
3.  See Kevin Anderson, "Cipro  Demand Outstrips  Supply,"  BBCNEWS (Oct. 25,  2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1618783.stm.
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as the market will price it in a competitive way.
AUDIENCE:  Do you have an example  of something  that we did that
I can stop my binary thinking with?
MR.  LESSIG:  I  think  the  example  of  saying that  nations  such  as
India and Brazil  should be permitted to produce these  drugs and  sell them
absent  the  patent  protection  that  covers  them-that  India  should  be
permitted  to  create  factories  within  Africa  to  produce  these  drugs,  is
exactly  the kind  of  exception  that  says  there  is  someplace  between  the
middle.  That is to say, we  except, we remove, certain  types of intellectual
property  protection  in  the  context  of  emergency,  and  admit  that,  while
embracing the ideal that we  insist on that intellectual property protection in
the  context  where  there  isn't  an  emergency.  Now,  if we,  as  a  political
culture  have  lost the  ability  to  say we  can tell  the  difference  between  an
emergency  and a non-emergency,  and  so therefore,  we need binaries  all or
nothing, then my main point is, at a certain stage, reason will catch up with
that  binary  thinking.  And  when  it  does,  what  we  have  done  will  seem
extraordinary to those who look back at these decisions right now.
AUDIENCE:  If  some  of  the  pressure  on  drug  companies  not  to
reduce prices  in other companies comes from what politicians in developed
or  rich  nations  might  say,  is  that  an  indictment of the  members  of those
countries  that  they  don't have  the  empathy,  or  is it  an  indictment  of our
culture in developed countries?
MR. LESSIG: It certainly  is an indictment of the political system. So
the question was, is  the fact that part of this problem is being caused by the
unwillingness  of  rich  nations  to  recognize  the  necessity  of  price
discrimination in the provision of a monopoly product like a patented drug,
is that an indictment of the political system? And the answer is, yes. It is an
indictment of our political  system.  And I'm not even  sure it's a  failure  of
the politicians to recognize this point, because I'm sure drug companies  sit
down  with  them  and  say,  you  have  to  understand  if  you're  going  to
embrace  a  system  of monopoly  protection  for  drugs,  then  you  have  to
permit  some  kind  of  price  discrimination  here,  and  that  means  rich
countries  have  to pay more.  I  think they  understand that. But the point  is,
it's such a hard argument  for other people generally  to understand that it's
very easy  for them to pretend  like they don't get it. And drug companies,  I
think  quite  reasonably,  recognize  that  it  would  be  very  hard  for  them  to
stand up  and  say, "we have  to have the right to charge  high prices  in rich
countries so that lower prices can be charged in poor countries."  But I think
what that means is that people, other than drug companies, need to stand up
and say exactly that.  The people  who  are  really interested  in  making  sure
that drugs  are  available  cheaply  in  developing  nations need  to  defend theTHE INTERNATIONAL  INFORMATION SOCIETY
right of the  drug  companies  to  charge  what  the  market  bears  outside  of
those  poor  countries.  That  unless  we,  activists,  who  want  to  spread  the
knowledge broadly, accept the consequence of the system we've embraced,
there  will  be  a  continued  political  pressure  that  will  force  the  drug
companies  to  adopt  exactly  this  strategy.  So  this  is  a  criticism  of the
political system.  I think in part it's a criticism,  too, of those of us who just
love  the  idea  that  everything  could  be  free.  Well,  here's  the  world  and
everything  isn't  free.  Drugs  are  not  free.  Drugs  cost  an  extraordinary
amount of money to produce. And someone's going to have to pay for that.
And the simple social justice point is-if anyone's going to pay for that, we
should. We should be paying for that. And  the system we've embraced  that
is  basically  forcing  them to  pay  for this with  their  lives,  will  be  seen  as
extraordinarily outrageous at the time we have to defend it to our children.
AUDIENCE:  INAUDIBLE.
MR. LESSIG:  Let me summarize  it like this. The  question is,  is  the
same argument  extended  in  the context  of something  like  software?  And,
would  I differentiate  software  from  the  drug  context?  So,  in  one  sense  I
wouldn't.  In  one  sense  I think  that  companies  like  Microsoft  also  face
exactly  this kind  of problem.  That if they had  strong price discrimination
across  countries,  they  would get  extraordinary  political pressure.  But  also
the pricing strategy  of companies  like Microsoft in a  country  like China is
very complicated.  And of course, they oppose,  and I think  rightly oppose,
software piracy  in China. But they  recognize that if the whole  world were
to give up software piracy and just start using operating systems which they
didn't have to pirate, like the Linux operating  system, that would  be a very
bad thing  for them.  So, in  some sense,  there  is a certain  amount of piracy
that is necessary  to sustain the spread and reach of the Microsoft operating
system. So I guess in that sense I think there's a similarity to it. But the part
that I  think  is different  is that, as  all of us  know when  we attempt  to  get
people  to  pay  attention  to  intellectual  property  issues,  it's  hard  to  get
anybody to care.  The one place where they will begin really to care is in the
context of drug patents. And  so what I'm suggesting  is that, this is the one
place  where  we  can  get  some  real  movement  and  gain  an  understanding
about  how  the  system  works  generally.  Because  those  of us,  and  I'm
counting myself in  this class,  there might be  a small number of us but we
hope  it  gets  to  be  larger.  Those  of us  who  fundamentally  believe  in  the
system,  but  believe  that  the  way  the  system  is  functioning  right  now  is
deeply wrong,  also believe that the way the system is functioning right now
will  ultimately  destroy  the  intellectual  property  system,  generally. It will
seem  outrageous  and  the consequence  of that  outrageousness  will  be  an
extraordinary  backlash  against  intellectual  property  protection, generally.
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And the harm that will follow from that is to drug companies first, and then
secondly to  all of us since they won't have the money  to invest to produce
new drugs. So  it's at this place we  both have to  try to  find a solution  that
saves the biggest holocaust that you could imagine, saves fifteen million to
thirty  million people,  and  at the  same  time,  moves  the debate  so that the
consequence  of  saving  fifteen  million  to  thirty  million  people  isn't
destruction of a system that I, at least  at this moment, think is necessary to
create incentives to produce drugs.
AUDIENCE:  It  was  suggested  by one  of the panelists  this morning
that  the  most  efficient  and  economic  way  to  provide  drugs  would  be  to
eliminate  patents  and  have  government  commissioned  scientists  to  take
care of this. Do you think that's a  viable alternative  to  the patent system?
And why not?
MR.  LESSIG:  I  don't  think  it's  viable  right  now.  Even  if I  were
convinced of its viability, I think it's too radical  a change right now.  I think
what's necessary is a bit of murkinism right now. What is the change on the
margin  that we  can  make  to  have  the  most  impact  on saving  lives?  The
change  on  the  margin  is  not  to  eliminate  the  system  completely.  The
change  on  the  margin  is  to  adopt  an  exceptionalism  that  recognizes  the
exception.  I agree that there may  be hard lines to draw.  Certain cases will
be extremely  difficult. But the fact that there'll be  hard lines to draw does
not, should not, stop us from drawing what I think most people would think
to be  an  extremely  easy  one.  Knowing  nations  that are  being  ravaged  by
this disease should deserve the exception of saying that we will accept this
for  a  period  of  time  for  these  nations  to  save  these  lives.  And  the
exceptionalism  might  actually  help  support  decisions  in  other  contexts
because  at least you are saying, it's not that patents are being violated, it's
just that patents  don't extend  here.  And patents not extending  in  different
material contexts has been a part of the patent system from its beginning.
AUDIENCE:  Why  not  propose  to  each  of  the  pharmaceutical
companies that for  every quality  of life  drug for which  you wish the  full
protection  to  be  absolute,  you  must  put  one  life  saving  drug  into  the
exceptional regime,  provided you either produce  it yourself or you license
them through another company?
MR. LESSIG:  I hadn't thought about that yet. It's a nice one though.
The problem,  you know, I guess I should then just not say more, because I
haven't thought about that yet. But let me pretend  like I had thought about
it. The  problem  with that  is just to  imagine that  there's  some structure  in
the  creation  of  drugs  that  would  make  that one-to-one  tradeoff  easy  or
accessible.  If I could  be convinced  of that, then that would be  fine.  But  I
wouldn't wait until I was convinced of that to  say the drug, in taking  stepsTHE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SOCIETY
right  now,  to  at  least  create  exceptions,  allow  the  exceptions  to  spread
without  creating  continued  pressure  on drug  companies.  Now,  what's  the
nature  of that recognition  for the  exceptions that  are necessary-you  give
one, the deal you strike with pharmaceuticals.  I'm going to be very precise
about where the problem is. We have  in the United  States  a kind of special
interest politics where companies  come to the trade representative  and say,
we  want  you  to  use  the  United  States'  power  to  achieve  the  following
modifications  of bilateral  negotiations  with  the  TRIPS  agreement.  Now
special interest politics is usually pretty harmless-who  cares? It's the way
the  government  works  in  ninety-eight  percent  of  what  it  does.  But
sometimes  the  special  interest  politics  is  extraordinarily  corrosive.  It's
corrosive  not just of the  world standing  of the United  States but corrosive
of the  very  system  it's trying to  defend-intellectual  property.  What I've
been suggesting is that we need recognition of how corrosive this process is
to  our  moral  standing  in  the  world,  and  to  the  system  of  intellectual
property that many of us are devoted to, in some sense, protecting. Because
unless there  is a recognition that this bilateral  negotiation process  corrupts
the basic  balance  that  the system  is  to  be pursuing,  then there will  be no
political  pressure  to  stop.  Unless  people  begin  to  say,  this  has  to  be
stopped,  then the corrosion  and  the weakening of the  intellectual  property
system that I'm describing will take place.
AUDIENCE:  Do  the  officers  of  the  drug  companies  have  a  legal
obligation to profit?
MR. LESSIG:  I  completely agree  with the  first part of what you're
saying.  You've  got  to  recognize  that  the  companies  do  what  they  do
because they're under an obligation  to make money.  So what  I was trying
to  suggest  is  the  reason  I  think  that  they're  not  making  this  available
cheaply  is  because  they  think  they'll  make  less  money.  But  they  won't
make  less money  because  they're  in  a  sense  giving  drugs  away,  they  are
worried  that they'll  make  less  money  because  they'll be  forced  to  charge
less for the drugs that they're able to charge for in the rich nations. So it's a
complicated  reason why they would make  less  money.  So my response to
that  is,  let's  find  a way  to make  it  so  that  they won't make  less  money.
Well,  what is the way to make it so they won't make less money?  To raise
awareness  about how wrong  it  is to insist that drug companies  lower their
prices in the rich nations in response to the fact that they are offering drugs
cheaply  in  developing  nations-like  that  argument  has  a  moral
consequence.  The  argument  to  say  that  the  fact  that  you're  charging  a
dollar  a pill in Africa means  you shouldn't be charging as much as you're
charging in the United States, that argument has the consequence of leading
drug  companies  to  avoid  lowering  costs  to  the poor  countries  around  the
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world.  So there's  a moral status variable  that I think we  should  recognize
and  then  criticize.  Now,  it's  not  that  they  could  do  it  on  their  own.  In
particular,  I think  drug  companies  are  the  last  people  in  the  world  who
should  stand up  and make  the  argument  that I'm  making.  But the people
who  need  to  stand  up  and  make  the  argument  that I'm  making  are  the
people  who  are  traditionally  thought  of  as  antagonistic  to  intellectual
property,  like  me.  People  like  me  need  to  stand up  and  say,  there's  an
important  value  protected by  this intellectual  property.  It's necessary,  and
we  can't  erode  it  by  allowing  our  desire  to  have  cheap  drugs  lead  to
developing  nations  having no  drugs.  So  it's part  of our  responsibility  as
much  as  it is the  drug companies.  We don't have  an obligation  by law to
make money, and I can say that we failed if we do, so we should just admit
it, and get on with making  the correct arguments.
AUDIENCE:  But  in  reality  there  are  virtually  no  patents  on  AIDS
drugs  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  so  patents  really  don't  stop  like  you  are
suggesting.  Indian manufacturers,  for  example,  the manufacturing  facility
in  Mozambique  or  India  or  wherever  you  want.  I  mean  there  are  some
patents in South Africa-you know, the Harvard study shows that there are
no-virtually  no patents  on the retrovirals.  So the problem  is in my view
somewhere  else.  The problem  is in  the  lack of infrastructure,  the need  to
have  an  infrastructure  and  also the  health  care  budgets  in  these countries
are, you know, like ten dollars per patient a year.
MR. LESSIG:  Yeah,  sure. And the GDP  is  one  dollar a person.  So,
you're  right. And so, let's be clear about  where the source of the problem
is. I'm not saying the fact that there are  patents in Mozambique  means that
people are unable  to get  drugs there.  But I am saying that the enforcement
of  the  patent  system  directly  or  indirectly  is  making  it  impossible  for
Mozambique  to afford  drugs  that  are  made  elsewhere,  and  made  without
patent protection,  to be  imported  into Mozambique.  This is  the  pattern  of
protection  that  is done  both directly,  through  law,  and  indirectly  through
political  pressure.  So,  until  Jamie  Love' S4  organization  succeeded  in
stopping the United States'  pressure on South Africa, the United  States was
pressuring  South  Africa  into  not  excepting  noncompliant  drugs  in  a
context. Now the other part of this that is extremely important to emphasize
is that I'm not saying that the drugs would be even curable. Obviously they
won't. These drugs, in particular, need to be administered  in a very regular
regime,  and  there  is  deep  concern  among  health  activists  that there  isn't
enough of an infrastructure  to support the regular consumption of the drugs
4. See Daryl Lindsey, "The AIDS-Drug Warrior,"  SALON.COM (June  18, 2001), at
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necessary  for  them  to  have  an  effect.  That  is  absolutely  right.  And  so
there's  got to  be  lots  of support  for these  other things,  too.  But  the point
is-here's  one  change  that  requires  no  massive  expense  to  affect  that
change. The one change that can be achieved  almost overnight would be a
liberalization of the incentives to move drugs into this area of Africa.
AUDIENCE: To ask  a more  constructive  question, what  would  you
think about  the consortium  that is  free from  the  antitrust  laws  combining
basically pharmaceutical  companies  wherever they are,  in India and  in the
United  States just to  target,  to  supply,  you  know,  drugs  at  the  cheapest
possible price to these countries?
MR. LESSIG: Well,  I'd like  to  see the  details  but I like the  general
idea. That's  a  simple way to  get  around the  problem  of incentives  to  get
them to produce and distribute drugs.
AUDIENCE: Because one of the issues in the retrovirals  is that many
manufacturers,  it's not one company supplying all the drugs.
MR. LESSIG:  Right. But  what  is  necessary  for that  to  happen  is  a
recognition  that we  create  a  special  exception  in  this context.  It  can  push
that  debate  in  light of the  extraordinary  pressure  that  will  be  put  on  the
intellectual  property  system generally if we don't succeed, then I think that
will  be  exactly  the  right  solution.  Thank  you  very  much  for  letting  me
speak.
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